Iraq’s Infrastructure
The Key to an Ideological Victory
By D.W.

The war in Iraq is really a conflict between competing ideologies of an emerging free society with a rigid authoritarian one. But if it is indeed an ideological conflict, why is a military occupation necessary?

Why can’t we just use soft power assets like radio broadcasts, international aid, and trade?

And furthermore, if democracy is such a good idea, why do we need to impose it upon a population with war?

The answer is that if you don’t have access to a country’s information infrastructure you can never influence the way that nation’s people think. This is especially true in a closed society like Saddam’s Iraq where very little unfiltered information and ideas was disseminated to the public. The Iraqi people, for the most part, didn’t like Saddam but they also could not imagine what the alternatives could be other than a hard line theocracy. And most importantly, they also couldn’t collaborate effectively without the ability to exchange information freely.
 

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And the military aspect of an ideological conflict is also a struggle over which side will control the public infrastructure.

Without control over the essential infrastructure like utilities, other public services, and markets a group cannot posses and maintain real control over the people. More importantly, it cannot disseminate ideological doctrine and initiate a paradigm shift amongst the population. During an ideological struggle, the winning side needs access to the media outlets, courts, schools, and other venues where it can impose its ideology.

In military parlance, the U.S. is conducting a foreign internal defense in Iraq by assisting a nation to defend itself against an insurgency. The U.S. must hold the line long enough in Iraq for the government to be able to maintain control of the infrastructure. If the U.S. were to cut and run from Iraq, various insurgent groups would gain control of the infrastructure and create a violent and vile theocracy.

But in the end, Iraq is an ideological war which must be fought and won with ideas.

For the insurgents to win (outside of the United States leaving), they must communicate to the Iraqi people that they alone can provide the best alternative to the current government. Part of this strategy is communicated through terror attacks that show the government to be ineffective, but that is not enough. The insurgents must also demonstrate that they can also provide better public services than the government in order for the public to truly support them.

Right now the insurgents haven’t accomplished this. Militia groups have gained control over certain neighborhoods and have imposed Shari’a law but they haven’t been able to provide the essential basic services to the people.

The Iraqi government must in turn convince the population that they are the legitimate authority.

Although a government establishes its legitimacy through security, it must also demonstrate it through elections, communication of activities, and communication between its representatives and to the people. The Iraqi government hasn’t done a very good job in effectively proving themselves, especially in certain parts of the country. And even though it controls much of the infrastructure, it still does not have mastery over most of it.

If the Islamist insurgents ever gained control over the public infrastructure like the newspapers and courts from which they could impose Shari’ a law, then they could create a genuine theocracy.

Likewise, if the U.S. wants to continue to develop and sustain a democracy in Iraq, it has to better control the Iraqi infrastructure in order to indoctrinate the Iraqi public with democratic and free market ideals. Furthermore, if the Iraqi government and the coalition forces ever completely lose control of the infrastructure it will be unable to transform the society and democratize the nation.

Now the U.S. and coalition governments truly support a free press in Iraq, which doesn’t really help their immediate mission of stabilizing the country. Insurgent groups readily use the local media to subvert the government in Iraq but in the long run, this is a necessary evil for supporting a free press and a free society.

Unfortunately, the U.S. press consistently undermines the U.S. war effort by spreading insurgent propaganda on a global scale. However, the media doesn’t belong to the insurgent groups thus the terrorists can’t use it whenever they want for whatever means they desire. In addition, there are plenty of media outlets in Iraq who also oppose insurgent groups and lend support to the government.

Needless to say, a common revolutionary tactic throughout all low intensity wars is for insurrectionists to establish a parallel infrastructure to meet public needs. They do this when the government lacks the ability to provide those resources or provides them poorly. This is happening in different areas of Iraq like Fallujah where they subvert the government’s ability to establish its legitimacy. In these safe havens, the insurgents control the infrastructure and they can impose their will and ideological systems on the population.

Thus, whether or not you agree with the war in Iraq, the only way to bring about genuine democratic change was to crack open the authoritarian system. The U.S. had to gain access to the Iraqi information system and its infrastructure in order to influence the Iraqi people on a wide enough scale necessary to spur cultural and social evolution.

Simply hoping that one day exiles and other dissenter groups would initiate change in Iraq was naïve although many Iraqi hucksters were able to sell that idea to the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, too many of our governmental officials bought it lock, stock, and barrel.

However, since we still have control over most of the Iraqi infrastructure we need to take full advantage of it to spread our message to the people.

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